University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science

2000

The Ethiopian Prospective Case
Sandra F. Joireman
University of Richmond, sjoirema@richmond.edu

Thomas S, Szayna

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
"The Ethiopian Prospective Case." In Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model, edited by Thomas S. Szayna,
193-237. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Chapter Five

THE ETHIOPIAN PROSPECTIVE CASE
Sandra F. Joireman and Thomas S. Szayna

INTRODUCTION
This chapter applies the "process" model for anticipating the incidence of ethnic conflict to the potential case of the emergence of
ethnically based violence in Ethiopia. Therefore, in contrast to the
two case studies presented previously, this case entails the use of the
model to consider prospectively the likelihood of an ethnic mobilization turning violent. The chapter examines the case of Ethiopia
from the perspective of what an intelligence analyst might conclude
were she to use the "process" model. In essence, we look at the
potential ethnic mobilization of the Amhara against the Tigraydominated Ethiopian state structures in an attempt to alter the political arrangements governing Ethiopia more in favor of the Amhara.
Data available as of 1997-1998 were used to conduct this analysis.
The choice of Ethiopia as a case study is in no way meant to suggest
that this country is somehow predetermined to slide into ethnic tensions or strife. The choice was. made on the basis of geographical
diversity (as other case studies examine different regions of the
world) and the country's regional importance.
Through the use of the model, the chapter examines the potential
grievances the Amhara might have against the state and the likely
path that their mobilization might take. Two secondary scenarios
examine the potential ethnic mobilization of the Oromo and the
Somali against the Tigray-dominated state, the potential paths of the
two mobilization processes, and the likelihood of strife that may
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result. This orientation is in line with the focus of the "process"
model on one particular kind of ethnic conflict, namely, the rise of an
ethnic group challenging the state.
The reason for selecting the Amhara challenge as the main scenario
stems partly from the specific influence that the Amhara have had in
Ethiopia in the past, their substantial population, and some evidence
of ongoing attempts at mobilization. The secondary scenarios examine the other main ethnic group (the Oromo) and a group (the
Somali) that is minor in terms of population but historically troublesome to Ethiopian state authorities. The authors emphasize that, at
this point of its development, the model is intended to be more suggestive than predictive. Neither the choice of the scenarios nor the
potential outcomes examined should be taken to imply that the
groups in question will mobilize against the government or that
confrontation with the state necessarily will result in violence.
As presented in the model, the group-versus-state conflict is the
simplest form of ethnic competition and, some may argue, not realistic when applied to the multiethnic conditions of Ethiopia. The
authors do not deny the obvious influence that any open AmharaTigray competition may have on the behavior of the Oromo toward
the state and other ethnic groups in Ethiopia. However, the authors
believe that, for the purposes of outlining in a parsimonious manner
the basic preferences that the state and the Amhara would have, the
model is sufficient. And the model is sufficiently flexible to allow
taking into account other groups' impact upon the dyad in conflict if
the impact is likely to be major. Finally, it is not clear whether the
advantages of a multigroup model would outweigh the complexity
and probable difficulty of its use.
Following the organization of the previous two chapters, four sections follow this introduction. The first section examines the structure of closure and provides an analysis of which ethnic groups
appear to be privileged and which seem underrepresented in structures of power (the demographic characteristics of Ethiopia in 19971998, on which the analysis is based, are appended at the end of the
chapter). Then it examines the strengths and weaknesses of the
challenging ethnic group-the Amhara-by looking at its potential
mobilization process. A shorter analysis of the secondary scenarios
is included. The second section looks at the capabilities the state-
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federal Ethiopia-might bring to bear in dealing with the challenging
groups. The third section examines the strategic choices, arrived at
on the basis of the assessments in earlier sections, that the state and
the group are likely to pursue vis-a-vis each other, given their
resource bases. Finally, a few observations conclude the chapter.

ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE

Closure in the Political and Security Realms
Since 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF)-the current party of government in the Ethiopian Parliament-has made an effort to open cabinet-level leadership and the
composition of the army to other ethnic groups, but such measures
are widely perceived as less than genuine or an outright sham. When
the EPRDF won the Ethiopian civil war in 1991, it was a predominantly Tigrayan organization (having recently changed its name from
the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, or TPLF). 1 One method the
EPRDF used to broaden its ethnic representation was to establish
"friendly" coalition parties, drawing representation from each ethnic
group. However, the ethnic parties are not necessarily representative
of their respective ethnic groups. For example, the Oromo People's
Democratic Organization (OPDO), formed to represent the Oromo
people within the EPRDF coalition, was originally composed of captured Oromo POWs and officers. The OPDO is viewed with suspicion
by many Oromo because of its origins and closeness to the EPRDF.
Its main rival in representing the interests of the Oro mo people is the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a much older and well-established
resistance army and political party. 2 This pattern of newly established EPRDF-affiliated groups, challenging older, rival parties to
represent ethnic interests, is repeated in other areas.
Regional and national elections of Ethiopia's highest-ranking political authorities took place in May and June 1995. The president has
1For a history of the TPLF, see John Young, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism," Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, pp. 105-120.
2There are also other smaller groups such as the Oromo National Liberation Front,
which draw support from the Oromo population.
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mainly ceremonial powers and is elected by the Council of People's
Representatives. The prime minister holds most of the executive
functions. The prime minister, elected by the Council of People's
Representatives, appoints the 17-member Council of Ministers
(subject to approval by the legislature). See Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Representation within the highest levels of the government-the
Council of Ministers and the legislature-is ethnically diverse, but
the true nature of power sharing is not clear. See Table 5.3. At least
five Tigrayan assistant ministers may have direct access to the prime
minister, which casts some suspicion on the true integration of the
Table5.l
Top Ethiopian Officials
Name

Position
Prime Minister
President
Secretary of the Council of the
People's Representatives
Speaker of the Council of the
People's Representatives

Ethnicity

Meles Zenawi
Negasso Gidada
Hailu Hailifom

Tigrayan
Oro mo
Tigrayan

Dawit Yohannes

Amhara

Table5.2
Council of Ministers, Ethnic Breakdown
Ethnic
Group
Oro mo
Am hara
Gurage
Tigray
Harari
Kembata
Somali
Afar
Weleyta
Hadiya

Number of
Ministers

Percent of
Ministers

4
4
2

24
24
12
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

1
1
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council. 3 In the legislature, the representation of various ethnic
groups is large, but the overwhelming majority of the members of
parliament (slightly over 90 percent) are from EPRDF-affiliated parties. Each region, which is ethnically defined, is allocated a certain
number of seats within the parliament. Typically, political parties
nominally controlled by local ethnic groups but under the EPRDF
umbrella have taken these seats. This is due, at least in part, to the
opposition boycott of the 1995 parliamentary election, in which most
of the opposition parties declared themselves unwilling to participate. 4 Thus, the parliamentary seats have been filled with people
representing their particular ethnic group, yet there is substantial
room for doubt as to just how much these MPs are trusted by most
members of their ethnic groups.
Table5.3
Representation in Government by Linguistic Affiliation

Language
Amhara
Oro mo
Tigray
Weleyta
Somali
Gurage
Hadiya
Kembata
Afar
Harari (Aderi)

Speakers (100,000s);
Percent of Total
15 (28.5)
14 (26.6)
4 (7.6)
2 (3.8)
2 (3.8)
1.5 (2.9)
1 (1.9)
l (1.9)
0.5 (1)
0.03 (0.06)

Number and Percent
of House Seats
Reserved for Their
Region (n = 548)
147 (27)
187 (34)
40 (7.3)
NA
25 (4.6)
NA
NA
NA
8 (1.5)
1 (0.2)

Representation by
Political Party;
Percent of Total
House
144 (26)
182 (33)
40 (7.3)
13 (0.4)
0
19 (3.5)
9 (1.6)
5 (l.O)
8 (1.5)
l (0.2)

3"Looking Federal," Africa Confidential, September 22, 1995, p. 5.
4 Their motive for doing so seems to have been threefold: (1) to withhold legitimacy
from the current government, (2) to protest restrictions placed on opposition access to
the print and television media, and (3) to protest the repression that some opposition
parties faced in the more remote areas of the country. See Terrence Lyons, "Closing
the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia," Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1996, pp. 121-142. Lyons documents reports of restrictions on
OLF political activities in the countryside.
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Data on the ethnicity of national director-level managers are not
available. Before the regime change Amhara were overrepresented
in such positions, and that situation may still persist. But based on
the policies of the government to equalize opportunities among
ethnic groups, there may be a lessening of the Amhara influence over
the director-level management of national institutional structures.
The opposite is true at the regional level, where information is available. In the regions there is a significant bias toward employing
people of each region's dominant ethnic group. For example, in the
Southern People's Region there has been an attempt to promote
members oflocal ethnic groups into the offices of judge and prosecutor.5
In terms of closure in the security realm, top positions are dominated
by Tigrayans and Amharas. The top security authorities in the country are the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, who both controls his own
personal security retinue and serves as the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces; the acting minister of justice, Worede-Wold
Wolde, 6 who controls the police force; and the minister of defense,
Teferra Walwa, an Amhara who supervises the armed forces. Kinfe
Gebremedhin, a Tigrayan and the former chief of security, controls
the Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority, which previously was the Ministry of Internal Security. Kinfe Gebremedhin reports directly to the prime minister, Meles Zenawi. 7
The minister of defense, Teferra Walwa, the highest-ranking security
official, is a member of the Amhara National Democratic Movement
(ANDM, an Amhara party under the EPRDF umbrella). He replaced
the previous minister of defense Tamirat Layne, who was fired very
publicly on charges of corruption. Beyond the ministerial level, there
is little information available about key security officials. In addition,
the administrative responsibilities of some of the security agencies
are not clear. For example, the role of Kinfe Gebremedhin at the
benignly labeled Security, Immigration, and Refugee Affairs Authority remains to be fully understood and yet is a key to determining the
5 s.

F. Joireman, interview with SPR court officials, Yirgalem, 1994.

6 Justice

Minister Mahetema Solomon resigned in June 1997.

7"Looking Federal," 1995.
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relative power and control of the security apparati. As the former
chief of security for the TPLF and as someone with direct access to
the prime minister, his role in internal security affairs most likely
equals or surpasses those of the ministers of defense and justice.
Indeed, his placement as head of the agency responsible for internal
security is an indication that the prime minister has viewed the
greatest threat to the Ethiopian state to be internal rather than
external.
Similarly, the ethnic makeup of the individuals who form the upper
levels of the security apparati is not publicly known. The Ethiopian
military has made well-publicized efforts to diversify the ethnic
composition of the lower levels of the armed forces, but it is not clear
to what extent, if any, this diversification has occurred in the officer
corps. In 1995, only three of the military's nine generals were
Tigrayan. 8 However, Tigrayans are known to be widely represented
in the officer corps.
Assessment of closure in the political and security realms. Closure
in Ethiopia is based more on political opinion than ethnicity. The
government has attempted to incorporate members of different
ethnic groups into its political fold, but only insofar as they agree
with the government platform and agenda. The Oromo provide an
important illustration. Those Oromo affiliated with the pro-government faction, the OPDO, are represented in national and regional
governments. Those in the anti-government faction (OLF members
and supporters) are not represented in either chamber of the legislature and did not stand for election. We have no way of measuring
support for the two Oromo factions. However, there are reports that
at least some Oromo view the OPDO as "seriously compromised"
due to its affiliation with the EPRDF. 9
Unfortunately, information on the exact ethnic composition of the
Ethiopian armed forces, both enlisted and officers, is not readily
available. Additionally, there are no data on the composition of the
regional police forces.
8u.s. Department of State, "Ethiopia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1996," Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, January 30,
1997, http://www.state.gov/wwwlissueslhuman_rightsll 996_hrp_report/ethiopia.html.
9Lyons, "Closing the Transition," 1996.
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Since there are no formal restrictions on access to power in political
or security spheres, the static snapshot of the Ethiopian system presented above appears to be dynamic enough to accommodate
change. Indeed, the government has gone out of its way to be inclusive of individuals of other ethnic groups willing to cooperate with its
political agenda. Ethnically based parties opposed to the EPRDF,
however, face informal government pressure, general harassment,
and a denial of access to the media.
A formal process for the replacement of political elites-including a
challenge along ethnic lines-exists, but opposition groups have not
taken the opportunity, restricted though it may be, to express their
dissent through the electoral process. Opposition groups have
repeatedly refused to participate in elections, the most recent of
which occurred in 1995. 10 This has placed both the government and
the country in an odd position. There is a means to replace the
current ruling group, but thus far the opposition has made no concerted attempt to take advantage of it; since the means has not been
tested, its genuineness is unclear.
There are informal barriers to political participation. There is some
suppression of overt dissent in Ethiopia. 11 The threat of government
intolerance to political opposition is real, highlighted by the
assassination or imprisonment of vocal opposition leaders within
Ethiopia. The government appears willing to tolerate quiet and reasoned dissent, but when the opposition becomes passionate, the authorities crack down.
There are no formal rules restricting the access of any ethnic group to
power at a national level in Ethiopia. But informally, EPRDF has
made no secret of its desire to keep a monopoly on power. Moreover, as stated earlier, within the regions there is an explicit preference for officials from ethnic groups indigenous to the regions.
10 s. F. Joireman, "Opposition Politics in Ethiopia: We Will All Go Down Together,"
Journal ofModern African Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 1997.
11 There have been two notable instances of repression of dissent under the current
government, both involving demonstrations by university students. The first occurred
in 1991 shortly after the EPRDF entered the capital, and the second occurred in March
1997. "University Students Released," Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa), March 28, 1997.
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Individuals from minority groups within regions will experience barriers to government or administrative services.

Closure in the Economic Realm
There is very little subnational data available on the economic sector
in Ethiopia. The results of the 1994 census, if they are ever fully published, may shed more light on the topic. Agriculture is the foundation of the Ethiopian economy. It accounts for approximately 43
percent of the gross domestic product and most of the country's export income. It is the primary source of employment in the country:
80 percent of Ethiopians are engaged in it. Apart from farming, the
state apparatus and the military are the next-greatest sources of employment in the country.12
There is no explicit information available on the distribution of
income within Ethiopia. Keeping in mind that neither farming,
working for the government, nor being a soldier pay particularly well,
we can guess that the upper tier of the Ethiopian economy is composed of people who are engaged in business pursuits. We can also
posit that the wealthiest in the society are urban Amhara (because
the majority of the educated, urban dwellers in Ethiopia are
Amhara). 13
Although there are no official figures available on the distribution of
wealth in the population as a whole or with regard to ethnicity, the
population of Ethiopia is generally extremely poor. The World
Bank's estimate of the Ethiopian GNP per capita in 1996 (latest available) was $ll0, placing the country among the poorest in the world,
at about the level of Somalia and Bangladesh.
However, we can make a few general observations about relative
wealth. First, because coffee is grown as a cash crop in the south,
12World Bank, From Plan to Market: World Development Report 1996, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996, p.188.
13 Recent census information puts the Amhara population at 49 percent of the total
population of Addis Ababa. Transitional Government of Ethiopia Office of the
Population and Housing Census Commission, Central Statistical Authority, The 1994
Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia Results for Addis Ababa, Volume I-Statistical Abstract, Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Authority, 1995.
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southern peasants who grow coffee are slightly better off than their
northern counterparts. Those lucky enough to have a college education or a job in the capital city or another urban center are better off
than the farmers in the countryside. With improvements in administration and efficient reinvestment ofresources, the Southern Nations
and Orama Regions should be the most wealthy in the country due
to the coffee and tea production there.
Assessment of closure in the economic realm. Again, it is extremely
difficult to make any conclusive statements on the structure of
wealth in Ethiopia. The only statement that is supportable (and only
on the basis of anecdotal evidence) is that because of their overrepresentation in the urban areas and because of the preferential access
they have had to education over the past century, the elite of
Ethiopia tend to be Amhara.
Is there a mechanism at hand for changing the static snapshot presented above? There are no formal restrictions on access to wealth in
Ethiopia. The only barrier to economic activity that is enshrined in
the political structure (albeit informally) is the restriction on agricultural investment in regions other than the home region of a particular ethnic group. 14 Additional problems may develop in the realm of
land allocation and land reform. There is currently no market for
land in Ethiopia, and regions are in the process of developing policies for land allocation and transfer. Should these policies tend to
exclude minority groups in the regions, there would be tremendous
potential for conflict. There are no identifiable restrictions on wealth
access that may disadvantage individuals of a particular ethnic
group.

Closure in the Social Realm
Status distinction in Ethiopia is a prominent issue, and both status
and ethnicity have become more controversial since the 1991 regime
14Sarah Gavian and Gemechu Degefe, "Commercial Investors and Access to Land," in
Dessalegn Rahmato (ed.), Land Tenure and Land Policy in Ethiopia after the Derg,
Trondheim, Norway: Working Papers on Ethiopian Development, No. 8, 1994.
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change. 15 Status at the national level only partly reflects political
dominance. The EPRDF is predominantly Tigrayan, but the Amhara
still retain the preeminent social position. A status stratification map
for Ethiopia might work out as illustrated in Table 5.4.
The Amhara and Tigray fill the top two places of the stratification
map for three historical reasons: nobility, mobility, and Christianity.
Both groups trace their ancestry back to the Abyssinian Empire of the
12th century AD. 16 Their joint cultural myth extends back even
further, dating the origin of these peoples to the meeting between
King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (an Abyssinian).
Mobility also explains the dominance of the Amhara and Tigray
peoples. In the 19th and 20th centuries the two groups moved out of
their traditional lands in the northern highlands of Ethiopia and took
over a large portion of the fertile coffee lands in the south. This
Table5.4

Status Stratification
Ethnic Group

Status

Amhara
Tigrayan
Aderi/Harari
Gurage
Oro mo
Somali
Afar

++
++
+
+

= high status; - - = low status
(compiled on the basis of data
presented earlier).
++

15The reasons are primarily tied to the "nation-building" endeavor by the government. John Markakis, "Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa," in
Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds.), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Hom of
Africa, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994, pp. 217-237.
16For further information on Ethiopian political history, see Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988; and Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.

204 Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Case Applications of a Process Model

movement into the southern marches of the Ethiopian Empire
resulted in the enserfment of the peoples who already lived on the
land. Those enserfed were the Oromo, Gurage, Gedeo, and Wolaita
people, among others. When the Amhara and Tigrayans moved into
these areas they brought the apparatus of the state with them and
enforced tax collection and the speaking of Amharic as the language
of administration within the country.
The third reason that both the Amhara and Tigray peoples are at the
higher end of the stratification map is that both groups are predominantly Orthodox Christian. This gives them a higher status due to the
ancient history of Orthodox Christianity in the region. The presence
of the religion has meant that there has been a written record in
Ethiopia since the 12th century, along with manuscripts on both
religion and politics. This ancient record is combined with a modem
sense of the importance of a "Christian" Ethiopia as a bulwark
against Islamic influence.
Until recently, the Amhara had unquestioned social dominance.
There was a separation between the Tigrayans and the Amhara during the early part of the 20th century as fighting developed between
Ras Hailu, the Tigrayan aspirant to the throne, and Haile Selassie, an
Amhara. As Haile Selassie's rule solidified, so did the iron grip of the
Amhara over the political and economic institutions of the country.
When the revolution came in 1974, Haile Selassie was succeeded by
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who, though of mixed parentage, identified
himself with the Amhara. Mengistu ruled until 1991.
The long stretch of Amhara leaders in Ethiopia has led to two inaccurate and insidious ideas among the Amhara. The first is the association of a particular Amhara "type" with the definition of Ethiopian:
by this notion, an "Ethiopian" is a slight, light-skinned, Christian,
Amharic-speaking farmer. The second is a sense of manifest destiny:
an idea that the Amhara are somehow ordained to rule a "Greater
Ethiopia." 17 These ideas are insidious because they give no quarter
to the majority of the population who do not fit this "type" linguistically, religiously, or ethnically.
17 "Greater Ethiopia" is a term used to include Eritrea, the state to the north of the
current Ethiopian border (along the Red Sea Coast), that recently gained its independence.
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It used to be the case that Amharans saw the Tigrayans in a consan-

guineal fashion, but political differences made ethnic distinctions
grow. Tigrayans spoke a different language, but it was understandable to Amharic speakers, and their cultures were virtually indistinguishable. The rift between the two groups was exacerbated in the
mid-1980s, when the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
became a thorn in the side of the Mengistu regime. As the TPLF
began its advance on the capital city of Ethiopia and then took it over
in 1991, the Tigrayans ceased to be cousins and became "foreigners"
in the rhetoric of the radical Amhara.
The Aderi, also known as the Harari, are aligned with the Tigrayans
on the stratification map, just as they are in government. The Aderi
are a population of approximately 26,000 who reside in and around
the ancient Islamic city of Harar in southeastern Ethiopia. They have
a high social status within the country because they are regarded as
distinct, refined, and ancient in their origins. The Aderi are overrepresented in parliament and the Council of Ministers, as they are
given one representative in each body for a group that is 0.0005 percent of the Ethiopian population. Other groups, with larger populations, don't have any representatives in the Council of Ministers.
This overrepresentation is due to the particular status of Harar, along
with Addis Ababa, as a designated multiethnic city-state, independent of any regional government.
The Oromo and Gurage are both historically oppressed and predominantly Islamic southern peoples. 18 Amhara and Tigrayan northerners enserfed large numbers of Oromo peasants in southern
Ethiopia until 1974. Even after 1974, the Oromo and Gurage were
forced to learn Amharic in order to achieve any sort of educational or
vocational success. The Gurage· are slightly higher on the social
18There are an increasing number of studies on the history of the Oromo and Oro mo
nationalism. Asafa Jalata, "Sociocultural Origins of the Oromo National Movement in
Ethiopia," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 21, 1993, pp. 267-286; Asafa
Jalata, Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868-1992,
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993; P.T.W. Baxter, "The Creation and Constitution of
Oromo Nationality," in Fukui and Markakis, Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of
Africa, pp. 167-186; Edmond J. Keller, "The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo and its
Implications for Politics in Ethiopia," Journal ofModern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4,
December 1995, pp. 621-634; and Asafa Jalata, Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian
Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy, Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997.
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stratification map than the Oromo because they are associated with
positive qualities based on their perceived business acumen.
The Somali and Afar peoples bring up the lower segments of the
stratification map because, in addition to being predominantly
Islamic, they are pastoralists. Pastoralism is viewed in Ethiopia and
throughout Africa as being less prestigious (even less human) than
settled agricultural practices.
What are the implications of this status distribution? At the national
level, there are no tangible benefits or disadvantages to being of a
particular ethnicity. In the regions there is a specific preference for
those of the local ethnicity to fill positions in the regional administration. Linguistic groups are not discriminated against in their
regions, but non-Amharic speakers may find themselves disadvantaged if they interact with the bureaucracy of the national government. Informally, a whole range of biases and perceptions surrounds status hierarchy, with members of the less urbanized and
non-Christian groups seen as less sophisticated or cultured. Such
biases have a self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing component and
affect myriad everyday decisions.
The fact that there is very little movement between status groups
attests to the lack of a mechanism for change within the Ethiopian
social stratification system. Indeed, the norm for social tolerance is
changing toward a greater degree of intolerance and ethnic solidarity. Since the ratification of the new Ethiopian constitution, ethnic
group and ethnic identity have become fundamentally important on
a political and social level. Ethnicity defines regional appointments,
political sympathies, and party affiliation.

Overall Assessment of Closure
Based on the information presented above, Table 5.5 summarizes the
degree of closure (in an overall sense as well as in the political, economic, and social realms) experienced by Ethiopia's main ethnic
groups. To reiterate, closure in Weberian terms refers to the "process
of subordination whereby one group monopolizes advantages by
closing off opportunities to another group." In the table, a group experiencing a "low" degree of closure has the most opportunities open
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Table5.5
Patterns of Closure by Ethnicity in Ethiopia
Political
Am hara

Tigrayan
Aderi/Harari
Gurage
Oro mo
Somali
Afar

Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

Economic
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

Social

Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
High

Overall
Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate/High
Moderate/High

to it. A group experiencing a "high" degree of closure has opportunities largely closed off.
The Amhara and Tigrayans show a consistent pattern of privilege,
and the Oromo and (especially) the Somali and Afar peoples are
experiencing a moderate degree of closure in Ethiopian social and
economic life. Politically, Tigrayans are dominant, but they do share
power to a moderate degree with other ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, poverty is a great equalizing mechanism among the
various ethnic groups. People in the countryside do not suffer high
degrees of relative deprivation. In the urban areas, however, the
Amhara and Tigrayans are present in greater numbers, and they are
more educated and better employed than the Somali and Afar. Yet
even if we take the differences between ethnic groups in the urban
areas into account, the relative deprivation between groups is quite
low.
Issues of closure in Ethiopia are primarily historic in their origin, but
they are changing, and we should expect to see changes in the economic and social positions of the ethnic groups in this generation.
Indeed, as the EPRDF political institutions take root, we should see
some groups, particularly the Oromo, gain in political power. As they
become politically powerful, we can expect their social position to
improve. Thus, the stratification patterns have some flexibility.
A final ranking of groups along the lines of privileged to dominatedin relative terms-is given in Table 5.6. The specific placement of
ethnic groups on the privileged-dominated scale is not evenly
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Table5.6

Ranking ofEthnic Groups in Ethiopia
Privileged

I
I
I
I
.!
Dominated

Amhara
Tigrayan
Aderi/Harari
Gurage
Oro mo
Somali
Afar

spaced, and the overall differences between the top and bottom
rankings are not extreme.
TRANSFORMING POTENTIAL STRIFE INTO LIKELY STRIFE

As a prospective case study, this section focuses on the process of
potential mobilization of one of the main ethnic groups against the
state. Three distinct potential processes of mobilization are sketched
out, each based on one of the ethnic groups. The primary scenario
focuses on the Amhara, and that mobilization process is sketched out
in full. The secondary scenarios, focusing on the Orama and Somali,
are discussed in a briefer format.
PRIMARY SCENARIO: AMHARA MOBILIZATION

The Amhara are among the most privileged ethnic groups in
Ethiopia. However, there is a critical disjuncture between Amhara
social and economic power and their current political weakness.
Resentful of their fall from power, suspicious of the current regime,
distrustful of any attempts at inclusion, and possessing a mythology
of a "right to rule Ethiopia," the Amhara are in a position to be mobilized for political action along ethnic lines. The abrupt change in
power relations in Ethiopia left the Amhara embittered, hostile, and
in search of a scapegoat. 19
19 Scapegoats have been found alternatively in Eritrea and the United States.
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Incipient Changes
The ethnically inclusive declaratory policy of the current government, as well as a strong Tigrayan role in the government, points to
longer-term trends under which the Amhara cold see their relative
share of power draining away. These trends put in place an everpresent source of concern among the Amhara for their social and
political position in the country.
Sudden or at least less-expected changes, caused by centrifugal tendencies in other regions of Ethiopia, also could spark greater Amhara
mobilization. For example, there have been rumors of a referendum
on independence for Oromia. 20 Although such a referendum would
be unlikely to succeed, given the composition of the regional
assembly, public discussion of such a thing will almost certainly
incite Amhara anger and provide fuel for mobilization. While many
Orama see the 19th-century Amhara/Tigrayan expansion as colonial,
Amhara tend to view "the conquered lands" as an inalienable part of
Ethiopia and would resist their dispossession.

Tipping Events
Galvanizing or tipping events might involve the release of Amhara
firebrands from prison or restrictions on Amhara media. The most
famous of the major recent attempts to mobilize the Amhara are
Professor Asrat Woldeyes's efforts to incite the rural Amhara to the
same level of fervor as radical urban Amhara. His efforts in this regard led to a jail sentence of five and a half years for attempting to
incite ethnic violence. Professor Woldeyes, viewed by many as the
spokesperson for the radical Amhara, faces additional charges associated with a prison escape in 1994, which resulted in the death of
several prison guards. Extended detention or lack of a trial for Woldeyes might prove a galvanizing factor in group mobilization.
A second possible tipping event would be a restriction on the publication of opposition newspapers such as The Addis Tribune and
other Amharic or Amhara-targeted papers. Amhara opposition
groups are already extremely sensitive to government censorship,
20 ''TPLF talks with OLF," Ethiopian Review, May-June 1997, p. 12.
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due to the fact that many of the journalists who have fallen afoul of
the government are Amhara. 21

Leadership
Because the urban Amhara tend to be better educated than members
of other ethnic groups, there are many present and potential leaders.
Some Amhara activist leaders, such as Asrat Woldeyes and Taye
Woldesemiat, are already in jail. Both men were university professors dismissed with 39 others in 1991 for their political activities. In
addition to these 41 activists are other urban educated Amhara who
have been working for the government or in the private sector and
have the knowledge and awareness of organizational techniques to
be more than able to lead an opposition group. Thus the leadership
potential among the Amhara is deep, though the emergence of a
specific individual as the leader is difficult to predict.

Resources and Organization
There seem to be ample resources available to the Amhara relative to
other groups (that is, within the overall constraints of an extremely
poor country). Radical Amhara groups within Ethiopia draw their
support primarily from the population of Addis Ababa. The urban
Amhara are among the wealthiest groups in Ethiopia, and they potentially provide a large resource base. There are signs that Amhara
activists are already using resources to obtain arms; the Ethiopian
government has uncovered one Amhara attempt to cache arms.
Political parties such as the All-Amhara People's Organization provide organizational structures for Amhara dissent and potential
political violence. An antigovernment urban terrorist group active in
Addis Ababa called the Ethiopian Patriotic Front offers an even more
radical vehicle for violence, and it apparently has mastered the
21 The

government has imprisoned 15 journalists in 1995-1996 for violation of the
press law. Some have been imprisoned for inciting ethnic hatred, but others are in
prison for violating accepted standards of decency. "Journalists Under Fire: 27 Dead,
a Record 183 Jailed in '96," The Washington Post, March 15, 1997.

The Ethiopian Prospective Case 211

organizational skills required of a conspiratorial group. 22 With some
of the most educated elite of Ethiopia, the Amhara would have ample
access to organizational skills, and would probably be the source of a
relatively large share of the overall availability of such skills in
Ethiopia.
A chauvinistic Amhara movement has moderate to high organizational potential. Perhaps its greatest obstacle is that the numerically
large Amhara population in the countryside is difficult to mobilize.
In addition to the normal conservatism that might be expected from
any peasant group, the Amhara peasants also experienced far more
of the last civil war than their urban counterparts did and may still
perceive the Tigrayan-dominated government as "Ethiopian" rather
than ethnic antagonistics.

Foreign Element
The most significant foreign influence on ethnic relations in Ethiopia
comes from Amhara abroad. The revenues collected overseas for the
Amhara cause, particularly in the United States and the Scandinavian countries, are probably the most important source of support
for the radical Amhara. In addition, Amhara groups in the United
States give aid to the mobilization process in the form of intellectual
justifications against the present status quo, disseminating them in
Ethiopia through both hard-copy publications and the Internet.
There is currently an effort to raise money in the United States for the
Ethiopian Unity Front (EUF), an Amhara insurgency movement. 23 It
is unclear at the moment whether the EUF has started activity within
Ethiopia, but the organization appears to have a ready cadre in the
United States.
A full-blown Amhara mobilization could count on little support from
neighboring governments. Eritrea does not want to see the Amhara
back in power, since it will then become a target of Amhara irreden22
Security forces within the capital city have stopped the open activities of this group.
The police continue to crack down on its remnants, one of whom, Assefa Marn, was
killed while allegedly resisting arrest in May 1997. "ETA Executive Committee
Member Shot," Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa), May9, 1997.
23 This group has been raising money in various U.S. cities. It is associated with the
Amhara-dominated party CO EDF.
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tist aspirations (an irony, given the denunciation of Tigrayans as foreigners by radical Amhara). Somalia is no longer a functioning state
and does not seem likely to become one in the near term, ruling out
its likelihood of being able to spend resources to support a major
social movement in Ethiopia. Sudan is something of a wild card. Its
Islamic government is unlikely to support any faction in Ethiopia
except the Orama. Sudan currently finds Ethiopia a convenient
scapegoat and blames it for the recent offensive of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-Sudan's own ethnic insurgency movement.

Overall Assessment of Mobilization
Strength of leadership will determine the intensity and effectiveness
of Amhara mobilization. Small cell groups that try to spearhead a
mobilization have formed already among the Amhara; at least some
of these cells are prepared to use violence in the pursuit of their
goals. With stronger leaders or, more specifically, leaders able to
gain the support of the countryside, the potential for effective and
widespread mobilization would escalate greatly. But the other elements of mobilization (resentment over perceived status usurpation,
access to resources both at home and abroad, strong organizational
potential) are in place, and the Amhara could command a powerful
movement.
SECONDARY SCENARIO: OROMO MOBILIZATION

Numerically the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia by many estimates,
the Orama have never been influential in Ethiopian government and
they have a low status in contemporary Ethiopia. The Orama face a
moderate level of closure and can point to some real grievances. The
primary problem that sustains the continuing low status and influence of the Orama is their weak leadership. With a cohesive leadership, the Orama probably would be the single most powerful ethnic
group in Ethiopia. But so far, the leaders of the various Orama factions have been unable to agree on either goals or tactics.
The Imperial Ethiopian government (before 1974) imposed brutal
sanctions on the Orama as a group. The Orama obtained access to
greater economic, if not political, benefits under the Derg government (1974-1991). In the early 1990s, the Orama Liberation Front
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(OLF) worked with the EPRDF to facilitate the overthrow of the Derg
regime. It was there, however, that their trouble with the current
government began, as two opposing factions developed within the
Orama. The first faction wanted some type of cooperation and participation with the EPRDF. The second favored secession from the
Ethiopian state and the establishment of an independent "Oromia."
The EPRDF's creation of the Orama People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) under the EPRDF umbrella exacerbated the rift within
the Orama. This group, in collaboration with the EPRDF, drew
power away from the OLF. The OPDO, representing an Orama
minority, participated in the elections of 1992 and 1995 and won all
of the Orama seats because the OLF declined to participate. The
OLF remains organized in the countryside and retains control of
weapons and men. There have been reports in 1996-1997 of OLFinitiated hostilities in the Orama region. In other words, there is a
dedicated cadre-willing to use violence-in place, and it could
spearhead the mobilization process. If the rumored referendum on
the independence of Oromia were to occur, a more powerful and
united Orama movement would emerge no matter what the outcome of the vote might be.
The splintering and weakening of the Orama as an ethnic group
organized for political ends could all be changed with the appearance of a young and charismatic leader. Youth is a necessity because
of the leadership conflicts and struggles for power that have divided
the older Orama leadership. An Orama mobilization might be aimed
at either a substantial share of political power within Ethiopia or an
outright independent Oromia.
In an overall sense, the mobilization potential of the Orama would
face resource problems. However, in the extremely poor conditions
of contemporary Ethiopia, the pure force of numbers could offset
some of the resource problems.
TERTIARY SCENARIO: SOMALI MOBILIZATION

The Somali population (part of the Ogadeni clan) is numerically
small but inhabits a compact area. The Somali face a moderate level
of closure and have real grievances against the government. A
Somali mobilization would have limited resource potential, espe-
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cially vis-a-vis the relative resource levels available to the Ethiopian
state. But if there were sudden changes in the balance of power in
Ethiopia (arising, for example, from one of the two scenarios
described above), the mobilization might be successful. Foreign
assistance-from Somalia-is a crucial variable that could augment
substantially the resource base of the Somali in Ethiopia.
Since the British relinquished the territory in 1955, the Ogaden has
been the focus of several military conflicts between Ethiopia and
Somalia (1960, 1964, 1973, 1977, and 1996). 24 Since 1991, the
Ethiopian government has engaged the armed Ethiopian Somali
group Al-Ithad Al-Islam in the Ogaden and across the border in
Somalia. The 1992 elections in the area had to be postponed because
of regional insecurity. The goal of the Al-Ithad Al-Islam-a group
that could lead the mobilization process-is openly secessionist, as
the group has tried to detach the Ogaden, now called the Somali
region, from the Ethiopian state. The Al-Ithad group has been implicated by the government of Ethiopia in several bombings in 19961997 in the capital city of Addis Ababa. 25
Currently, the Ethiopian government maintains control of the
Ogaden through administrative and police means, keeping any mass
mobilization at bay. But if the Somali state were to again become
viable, the situation might change. Moreover, if the Somali state
were to resurface with a ruler from the Ogadeni clan, the stability of
the Ethiopian Somali region certainly would be at risk. The area also
may have potential for oil production. It was, in fact, rumors of oil
discoveries in the Ogaden that led to the 1973 conflict between
Ethiopia and Somalia. Further discoveries or rumors of discoveries
may exacerbate the conflict that already exists.
In an overall sense, the mobilization potential of the Somali is constrained by resource problems. But the situation could change in the
relative sense-in case of ethnic mobilization within Ethiopia by
another, major group-and in the absolute sense, by way of assis24 For more background information, see Patrick Gilkes, Conflict in Somalia and
Ethiopia, NewYork: NewDiscovery, 1994.
25 But it should be noted that in the investigation of at least one of the bombings, the
Al-lthad Al-Islam might have been used as a convenient scapegoat by the police.
"Explosions in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa," Ethiopian Review, May-June 1997, p. 12.
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tance from Somalia. The clan-based structure of the Somali provides
effective channels of organization through which to funnel and use
the resources. The clan structure also provides a means of legitimization for a potential Somali leader (assuming skillful leadership
that could unify the various factions within the clans). Moreover, a
moderate to high degree of closure provides readily identifiable
grievances around which to mobilize the group. The potential of a
windfall from natural resource exploration could fuel further the
mobilization.

ASSESSING THE STATE
Accommodative Capability
How inclusive and responsive are Ethiopian political structures to
the general population? The political institutions in Ethiopia are
ostensibly democratic and inclusive, though in practice they have
failed to fulfill their functions, as few opposition groups so far have
chosen to participate formally in the electoral process. The view of
the governing structure as essentially a sophisticated fig leaf for
Tigrayan control has discouraged widespread participation. The goal
of the opposition parties that do not agree with EPRDF policies is to
"deny legitimacy" to the government. 26 The clearest example of
group exclusion concerns the Oromo Liberation Front. The OLF has
opted out of the formal political process since 1991 and the formation of the transitional government of Ethiopia. This is troublesome
because the Oromo are the single largest ethnic group in Ethiopia.
But if they want to participate in government, non-Tigrayan groups
are required to accept a strong Tigrayan role in defining Ethiopia and
its political agenda. Many organfaations may not relish cooperation
of this sort, since their constituents may interpret it as collaboration,
with all the attendant negative repercussions.
Is there potential for change in Ethiopian political structures? Mechanisms for conflict resolution and institutional change are built into
the Ethiopian constitution. According to it, questions of federal and
regional laws that contradict the constitution are sent to the upper
chamber of the parliament (the Federal Council) for resolution. Pro26 Lyons, "Closing the Transition," (1996).
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posed amendments to the constitution follow a more complicated
process through the regional councils and then both national houses
of parliament.27 The constitution includes a process by which ethnic
groups may secede from the Ethiopian state. 28 Because the
constitution has been in force only since mid-1995, its provisions for
conflict resolution remain to be tested. In other words, they exist in
theory but have not yet been practiced.
In short, it is too early to assess whether the channels for institutional
change are effective. Nominally, the political system is inclusive, and
its decentralization aims at a high level of participation (from at least
the major ethnic groups). But the inclusiveness for now is embedded
in the larger context of Ethiopian recent history, that is, within the
constraints of a completely new system of governing set up by an
ethnically defined group that won a lengthy civil war. As such, the
system has not managed to convert the skeptics, as most of the nonTigrayan population appears to view it with a measure of distrust, a
Tigrayan creation. As the system develops and matures, the opposition parties may decide to "legitimize" the political process with their
participation. The election in the year 2000 will be key in determining the relative inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the regime.
In terms of prevailing norms of governance, neither the autocratic
imperial Ethiopian government (pre-1974) nor the Derg (1974-1991)
were tolerant of opposition. The Derg used widespread violence and
repression to deal with any kind of dissent, real or imagined. In
comparison with such a past, the post-1991 norms of governance
have been remarkably tolerant and inclusive, even though there has
been some retrenchment since 1994. 29 Initially, the EPRDF made a
27The Constitution of the

Federal Democratic Republic ofEthiopia, 1995.

28 Some

have argued that the constitution reflects the very nature of the Tigray rise to
power and its attempt to redefine the state as one comprising many distinct cultures;
thus, the right to secede is a fundamental aspect of the TPLF view ofEthiopia. Assefaw
Bariagaber, "The Politics of Cultural Pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: Trajectories of
Ethnicity and Constitutional Experiments," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6,
November 1998, pp. 1056--1073.
29 Since

1994 and the end of the transitional charter, the government's behavior
toward groups that opposed or declined to participate in the political process has
shown a trend toward less tolerance, with incidents of intimidation and force used
against domestic opponents. The incidents include the arrest and imprisonment of
journalists, a public war of words with opposition groups, and crackdowns on demon-
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distinct attempt to include other groups, such as the OLF, in the governing coalition. It also allowed a free press to flourish and sought
the political opinions of the populace (i.e., the constitutional
"discussions" that occurred at the neighborhood level). Thus, the
governing structure set up by the EPRDF has tried for inclusiveness
in a way that showed a real break with the previous patterns of governance, even if the limited participation by non-Tigrayan groups in
the governing process so far suggests their persistent distrust. In
addition, the ethnically based federal structure shows the vitality of
ethnically defined collectivist norms. Finally, for many Ethiopians,
including members of the Orama and many smaller groups, an
Ethiopian identity is weak and secondary to their ethnic attachments.30
What is the level of cohesion among the ruling elites? Little information is available about the inner workings of the EPRDF government,
but there are some signs of discord. The discord may center on policy differences rather than fundamental issues on the setup of the
state. The very public firing in 1996 of the deputy prime minister and
minister of defense, Tamirat Layne, may be an indication of a power
struggle. Whether this was the elimination of one individual or an
indication of deeper splits and factional power struggles within the
ruling coalition is uncertain. Adding to suspicions of conflict within
the party was a purging of OPDO party members in April 1997.
Eighty OPDO members were subsequently placed in custody. This
development suggests that cohesion among the EPRDF coalition
partners is declining and that the EPRDF is willing to take action
against partners who are not toeing the party line. The trend appears
to be toward a more isolated Tigrayan-based governing coalition.
Whether the trend means an increase or decrease in leadership cohesion is impossible to say at this time.
In conclusion, the accommodative capability of the Ethiopian state is
difficult to assess in an unequivocal manner because of the ambiguities surrounding it. The institutional structure of the state seems
strations. In part at least, the more forceful government reaction is a response to the
non-participation of other groups in the process. S. F. Joireman, "Opposition Politics
in Ethiopia," September 1997; "Students Say No to Petition and Remain in Detention,"
Addis Tribune (Addis Ababa). April 4, 1997.
30see the Afterword to this chapter for potential changes to this situation.
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viable for an inclusive and responsive system, but the legacy of a long
period of interethnic tensions and distrust remains a practical obstacle to achieving the democratic potential of the institutional structure contained in the constitution. A move by the coalition toward
less inclusiveness of other groups may, in fact, have the effect of
strengthening the internal cohesion of the ruling group.

Fiscal and Economic Capability
The fiscal health of Ethiopia shows serious strains, and the mainstay
of the economy-agriculture-is subject to weather- and climateinduced disruptions. However, the macroeconomic indicators have
stabilized and the economy has registered consistent growth since
the end of the civil war (1.7 percent in 1993-1994 and 4.9 percent in
1994-1995). The state's economic targets through 1999 include 6
percent real GDP growth, limiting the external current account
deficit to 9.2 percent of GDP, and maintaining low inflation.
Although the goals are ambitious, they are realistic, assuming no
major drought and/ or worldwide recession.
The state has followed a consistent pattern of deficit spending. In
the fiscal year 1994-1995, the Ethiopian budgetary deficit reached 3.8
percent of GDP. Ethiopia also has a heavy debt; the World Bank rates
Ethiopia as severely indebted and "possibly stressed" regarding the
sustainability of its debt burden. 31 In 1995, approximately 13.6
percent of Ethiopia's earnings from exports went to the payment of
the interest and principal on debts. 32 Ethiopian gold reserves have
remained steady, and its foreign exchange position has improved
significantly since 1992. The state also has further loans it could call
on from international lending institutions. See Table 5.7.
Widening the tax base and improving tax collection remain central
objectives of the government. Customs duties and sales taxes remain
important for revenue generation. Taxes on personal and business
income and profits have risen substantially. Both trends imply an
improved tax-collection system. There is some potential for the
31 World Bank, Global Development Finance, Volume 1, Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, 1997, p. 43.
32Ibid., p. 216.
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reappropriation of funds within the state budget. Although health
and education have registered substantial growth since 1992 and
strict defense expenditures have gone down to 13 percent of the
current expenditures in the 1994-1995 fiscal year, there seems to be
enough leeway for further shifting of funds on a short-term basis.
See Table 5.8.
The wealth of the core constituency of the ruling elite does not differ
at all from the wealth of the general population. Neither this group
nor any other in Ethiopian society faces a disproportionate tax burden. Some accusations have surfaced that a disproportionate
amount of development aid is directed toward the Tigray region, but
since Tigray received little development assistance from the government between 1984 and 1991, even if this were to be the case it would
Table 5.7
Ethiopian National Bank Reserves (in US$ million)
1993

1994

1995

Gold (national valuation)
IMF special drawing rights
Reserve position in IMF
Foreign exchange

ll.4
0.3
9.6
445.9

11.4
0.4
10.2
533.6

11.4
0.3
10.5
760.8

Total

467.2

555.6

782.9

SOURCE: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Table5.8
Ethiopian Government Expenditures (in millions ofbirr)

Total
Capital expenditure
Current expenditure
State administration, defense, and police
Education and health
Interest and charges
SOURCE: National Bank ofEthiopia

1992-1993

1993-1994

1994-1995

6,054
2,150
3,904
1,173
583
530

7,492
3,018
4,474
1,453
742
952

8,152
3,077
5,075
1,561
936
855
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hardly change the wealth of Tigrayans vis-a-vis other Ethiopian ethnic groups.
In sum, in an absolute sense, the fiscal capacity of the Ethiopian state
is weak. But within the constraints of being one of the poorest
countries in the world, Ethiopia's state policies of economic liberalization have borne some fruit. Although the fiscal and economic
resources and capabilities available to the government remain low,
the situation is improving.

Coercive Capability
Cabinet ministers, subordinate to the prime minister, control the
police and the armed forces. The police are under the control of the
Justice Ministry. The minister of defense (Teferra Walwa) is constitutionally required to be a civilian. 33 In addition, Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi has his own security team headed by TPLF Central
Committee member Mulugeta Alemseged. Rather than an instrument of control over portions of the population, the team is oriented
more toward the protection of the top leadership. Formally, there is
constitutional provision for a state of emergency; at such a time,
there is a restriction on "fundamental political and democratic
rights." The Council of Ministers can declare a state of emergency
when there is danger to the "constitutional order" that cannot be
brought under control by means of normal law enforcement. The
Chamber of People's Representatives must approve any declaration
of a state of emergency, though under the conditions of near-complete EPRDF control of the legislature, this provision is not a major
obstacle. In practice, despite the formal rules restricting the use of
force, extrajudicial killings and disregard for civil rights and due process within the country have grown in number.
Who serves in the apparati of violence? Although the government
has attempted to form a "multiethnic defense force" consisting of all
of Ethiopia's ethnic groups, the armed forces continue to be based
on the armed wing of the EPRDF (and especially the TPLF) that won
the civil war. A substantial number of personnel from the OLF were
also absorbed initially into the single post-civil war Ethiopian mili33Article 95,

Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
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tary, though their continued presence is in doubt in view ofthe OLF's
withdrawal of its support of the government in 1992.
Official statements claim that the military is now far more representative than it was in 1991, when it was predominantly Tigrayan with
some Amhara participation. 34 In line with the striving for greater
inclusiveness, new recruits of all ethnic backgrounds go on to officer
training if they are assessed as having promise. According to a recent
USIS report, in 1995-1996, 25,000 primarily Tigrayan soldiers were
demobilized and replaced by recruits from other ethnic groups. 35
However, several thousand of the demobilized Tigrayan soldiers
have become policemen. 36 One can raise questions about how loyal
Tigrayan police officers assigned to regions other than Tigray will be
to the regional police hierarchy.
What norms exist with respect to the use of violence domestically?
Every government in Ethiopian history has used the armed forces to
crack down on domestic uprisings. 37 Indeed, there is no precedent
within the country for government restraint in its actions against citizens. The EPRDF government, since 1991, has been less violent
toward its citizens than any other in recent history, but accusations
of extrajudicial killings and beatings in the south and torture within
the prisons have surfaced. 38 More recently, in May 1997, an alleged
leader of the Ethiopian United Patriotic Front was killed in Addis
Ababa under suspicious circumstances (with government spokesmen claiming he was "resisting arrest"). 39
Ethiopian culture, insofar as can be generalized among all its ethnic
groups, has a relatively low threshold for violence. Violence is often
used as a means of political expression, and there is only limited
34

"Effort to Build Multi-National Defense Force Successful," Ethiopian News Agency
(Addis Ababa), July23, 1996.

usrs, 0996).
36 "Looking Federal," Africa Confidential, September 22, 1995, p. 5.
37See Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991; Africa Watch, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia, New
York: Human Rights Watch, 1991.
38Lyons, "Closing the Transition," 1996.
35

39Reuters African Highlights (Addis Ababa), May 8, 1997 (Internet version).
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experience with ideas of human rights as enshrined by the United
Nations.
Are the armed forces suitable for domestic use? The armed forces are
largely light infantry, suitable for domestic use, especially in an environment of permissive norms toward violence. Most soldiers have
extensive experience fighting in the Ethiopian countryside, gained
during the civil war. The military could be employed in a range of
activities, from forceful crowd control to counterinsurgency. Training for domestic use is likely to be rudimentary.
In conclusion, the state can readily resort to violence, and the apparati of violence have considerable capabilities against domestic opponents. Use of force in the domestic context is constitutionally
allowable through the imposition of a state of emergency.

STRATEGIC BARGAINING
This analysis of the potential mobilization of the Amhara, and to a
lesser degree that of the Oro mo and Somali groups, on the one hand,
and the capabilities of the Ethiopian state to deal with any such
mobilization, on the other, provides a means for considering the
possible interactions between them based on the categories and
matrices of the framework presented in Chapter Two. As in the two
previous cases, the group and state types are categorized on the basis
of their capacities, and the matrices provide a way to think about
their interaction conceptually.

Measuring the Group's Capacities
The leadership of the Amhara is confident. This confidence stems
from the mythology of the group, including perceptions of manifest
destiny, the view of the current government as unrightfully in place,
and the strong rhetoric supporting these views emanating from the
Amhara diaspora in diverse areas of the world. The leadership has
not hesitated to take risks. The radical Amhara activists are united in
their intent to overthrow the current government, though what type
of regime they think should take its place, a predominantly Amhara
state or a multiethnic state, is not yet clear. Thus, the assessment of
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leadership that a potential mobilized Amhara is likely to have is
"strong."
With respect to resources, support for the Amhara is good, especially
in the relative sense of the poor conditions in Ethiopia. The Amhara
activists have an extensive support network overseas, and they draw
their support within the country from the wealthiest and most educated people. At present the resource base is sufficient to support an
urban-based movement against the government. The available support is well-suited to the goal of ousting the current regime from
power. But it may not be enough if the objective is to establish a
predominantly Amhara rather than multiethnic state. Thus, the
assessment of resource support that a potential mobilized Amhara is
likely to have is "good."
Regarding popular support for the Amhara mobilization, the activist
Amhara cohort so far is primarily urban. The more numerous
Amhara in the countryside have not been mobilized. Land reform
may yet change the situation, but there is little evidence of it at the
present. In addition, there are no readily identifiable other groups
that seem willing or likely to support the Amhara. The Tigrayans are
currently in control of the government and are, therefore, the enemy.
The Oromo are extremely unlikely to form any sort of alliance with
the Amhara, for many Oromo consider them former "oppressors."
Thus, the assessment of popular support that a potential mobilized
Amhara is likely to have is "weak."
Based on these assessments, the mobilized Amhara is judged to be a
type D group. The capacities of such a group are as follows:
Accommodative: low;
Sustainment: high;
Cohesiveness: high.

Measuring the State's Capacities
Concerning the leadership of the state, the EPRDF government built
a guerrilla army and created a development arm and a well-constructed ideology before it won a civil war in 1991. After emerging as
the victors in the war, the EPRDF then tried to build a multiethnic
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ruling coalition for Ethiopia, with EPRDF at the core. It also wrote a
new constitution and embarked on development projects within the
country. There is no question that the leaders ofEPRDF are secure in
their position and beliefs. They have attempted to make the system
of governance inclusive to all Ethiopians but have not hesitated to
use forceful means in implementing their policies. They have a clear
vision of a more developed and prosperous Ethiopia, based on
consociational ethnic relations and a market economy. Thus, the
assessment ofleadership is "strong."
In terms of its fiscal position, the state has engaged in deficit spending and has become deeply indebted. There is some room for reallocation of funds, within the overall constraints of a low state budget.
If the economy continues to expand, there are more optimistic
prospects for the future. But the agricultural base of the economy
and a dependence on the export of primary products as the source of
most foreign exchange puts in place a low ceiling for growth and revenue generation. Thus, the assessment of fiscal position is "weak."
Regarding the regime type of the state, this capacity is not as clearcut as the others. The Ethiopian regime exhibits the characteristics
of both types. Institutions exist for competitive elections and the
replacement of government officials; however, these institutions
have not been put to the test sufficiently to conclude without hesitation that the regime is inclusive. A largely free media exists, though
some harassment and intimidation of the press is evident. There are
limits on executive power, but there are also prevailing norms of
intolerance. The tendencies will be easier to ascertain in another few
years, especially after the elections in 2000. Yet it is clear that the
current regime is much more inclusive than the previous regimes in
recent Ethiopian history. Thus, on a close call, the regime is assessed
as "inclusive."
Based on these assessments, the Ethiopian state is judged to be a
type C state. The capacities of such a state are as follows:
Accommodative: high;
Sustainment: low;
Coercive: low.
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Note that ifthe regime type is assessed as exclusive, then the coercive
capacity is high, and the state type is G.

Outcome of Bargaining and Preferences for Violence
Based on the matrix showing the preferences of the mobilized group,
a type D group has the following preferences toward a type C state:
(1) negotiate, (2) exploit, and (3) intimidate. Based on the matrix
showing the preferences of the state toward a mobilized group, a
type C state has the following preferences toward a type D group: (1)
repress, (2) exploit, and (3) negotiate. Note that if the state type is G,
due to an assessment of the regime as exclusive, the group's preferences change to exploit, negotiate, intimidate. The state's preferences remain the same: repress, exploit, negotiate.
Comparing group and state preferences leads to the conclusion that
the potential for violence in the dyadic encounter between a primarily urban-based mobilized Amhara and an EPRDF (Tigrayan)
Ethiopian state is high. The violence-prone outcome stems primarily
from the state's preference for a strategy of repressing the challenger,
with a hedging strategy of exploiting the weakness within the mobilized group. In practical terms, the latter may mean a forceful crackdown and intimidation of the urban Amhara and incentives to the
rural Amhara to continue their acquiescence. Quite simply, the
EPRDF has few resources with which to head off dissent, but it has a
disciplined and cohesive leadership, a blueprint for the future, and
control of substantial apparatus of violence, all of which make it
determined to stay in power, by force if necessary. The preferred
Amhara strategy is to negotiate, with a hedging strategy of exploitation or, failing that, perhaps even outright intimidation of the state.
But the pattern of preferences in strategies clearly illustrates the
weakness and power difference between the group and the state.
If the state is assessed as an exclusive regime type, then the group's

first two preferences are reversed. A more forceful strategy of
exploitation is the preferred strategy, for the state makes the situation of the Amhara worse and the group then needs to demonstrate
its resolve.
The choices in the original matchup are interesting because they are
the inverse of each other. The state starts from a position of strength
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and has incentives to keep its superior position. On the other hand,
the Amhara start from a position of weakness and are wary of an
escalation to violence because that will put the group at risk. The
group has incentives to continue to negotiate (forcefully, through the
exploit option, if need be) but not to resort to all-out force.
If the Amhara leadership were able to mobilize the rural Amhara,
turning the group type to A, its choices against a still predominantly
inclusive regime type (state type C) would stay the same. Moreover,
the group would stand a real chance of having a larger access to
power, because the state's preference would shift to negotiation as
the preferred strategy. But if an Amhara shift to type A is accompanied by a state move toward a more exclusive regime type (state type
G), then violence becomes the preferred strategy for both sides.
Intelligence analysis needs to be on the alert for such an evolution in
Ethiopia.

What is telling about the choice of strategies is that the state has little
tolerance for any challenges from the Amhara, and the state's resource base supports a strategy that includes a quick recourse to
force. The Amhara are weaker and, from a resource base perspective,
their demands and tactics are likely to be moderate.
The Oromo. With respect to the secondary scenarios of mobilization, the current situation of the Oromo is characterized by weak
leadership, weak resource support (predominantly poor and rural),
and broad popular support (largest single ethnic group, with appeal
potential beyond the Orama), which make it group type E. The
group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are
exploit, negotiate, intimidate. The state's preferences against the
group are exploit, negotiate, repress. If the state type is assessed as
G, then the group's preferences are negotiate, exploit, surrender, and
the state's preferences become exploit, negotiate, repress. In neither
of the four sets of preferences is violent outcome either a first or
second preferred strategy. According to the framework, there is little
potential for Orama-centered violence.
If the Orama move toward a strong leadership (group type C), then
the group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are
negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's preferences are negotiate,
exploit, repress. In other words, even if the Orama mobilize with a
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strong leadership, there is still little potential for violence if the state
stays inclusive or moves further toward inclusion of other groups.
However, the Oromo with a strong leadership (group type C) facing a
state type G (exclusive regime) have very different preferences:
intimidate, exploit, negotiate. The state's preferences then become
repress, exploit, negotiate. In other words, the primary strategic
preferences for both the state and the group are for the use of
violence.
The Somali. The current situation of the Somali is characterized by
strong leadership, weak resource support, and weak popular support
(small overall numbers, limited appeal to other groups), which make
it group type G. The group's preferences against state type C
(inclusive regime) are negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's
preferences against the group are repress, exploit, negotiate. If the
state is assessed as G, then the group's preferences are exploit, intimidate, negotiate. The state's preferences remain repress, exploit,
negotiate. In short, the state has a preferred strategy of violence
toward the group. The group's preference for violence increases as
the state turns toward greater exclusiveness. According to the
framework, there is good potential for violence to accompany any
Somali mobilization.
If the Somali move toward greater resource support (group type D),

perhaps as a result of assistance from a reconstituted Somalia, then
the group's preferences against state type C (inclusive regime) are
negotiate, exploit, intimidate. The state's preferences are repress,
exploit, negotiate. Against a state defined as an exclusive regime
(state type G), the group's preferences are exploit, negotiate, intimidate. The state's preferences reniain repress, exploit, negotiate. In
other words, the state has a preferred strategy to turn to violence to
counter a Somali mobilization in conditions of both limited or strong
resource support from Somalia. Given the shape of the state's responses to Somali activism so far, the assessment is on the mark.

Revisiting the Evaluation
There is much to be said for the portrayal of the type of ethnic tensions between the Amhara and the Tigrayan-dominated state as
expressed in the terms above. The Amhara have followed the identified strategic preference for negotiation. The preference does not
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mean that some activists within the group are not preparing for more
forceful action, and factions of the Amhara, both in Ethiopia and
abroad, advocate strong measures. 40 But so far, the Amhara have
"negotiated" through implied threats and a more pronounced mobilization effort. The Amhara have launched neither an insurgency nor
even a terrorist campaign; they have stayed largely within the bounds
of peaceful, if sometimes attention-getting, methods.
The state has shown little tolerance for any challenger. It has acted
to repress vocal dissenters, and its potential for violent measures
seems to be understood by all the major actors in Ethiopia. Whether
the state moves toward being more or less inclusive during the next
few years is crucial. If it moves toward greater inclusivity, then the
strategic preferences of any challenging groups will also change,
usually toward more peaceful methods of taking on the state.
The Oromo and Somali relationship with the state also falls within
the bounds of the conceptual framework of the model. The main
Oromo groups disagree on the extent of participation in the government, with the differences primarily based on greater sense of separation or inclusion of the Oromo in Ethiopia. Negotiation strategies
predominate, as borne out in reality. Similarly, the Somali relationship is captured in the preference of the state for repression no
matter which of the two main paths the Somali mobilization takes.
The heavy-handed state control over the Somali (emphasizing the
role of the police), indicates the accuracy of the framework.
For the purposes of tracking the evolution of interethnic relations in
Ethiopia, any appearance of the following trends needs special monitoring by intelligence analysts:
•

A clear move by the EPRDF away from the attempt at inclusion of
other ethnic groups in the governance of the country and toward
a more narrow emphasis on the Tigray. Specific indicators might
include a dwindling influence of non-Tigrayan parties (the
Amhara National Democratic Movement [ANDM] and the
Oromo People's Democratic Organization [OPDO]) within the
EPRDF, greater prominence of Tigray mythology in EPRDF's

40Taye Walde Semiat and the Ethiopian Patriotic Front, now also the Ethiopian United
Front.
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statements, or even the creation of a Tigray-centric vision of
Ethiopia as a guiding plan for the future evolution of the country.
In terms of the model, this would represent a move toward state
type G, one of the most violence-prone state types.
•

A significantly higher level of openness to and acceptance of
urban Amhara appeals by the rural Amhara. Specific indicators
might include the loss of support for the ANDM in the rural
Amhara areas, a changed pattern of activity of the Amhara militant groups, and changes in philosophy and pronouncements of
the urban Amhara activists to include concerns central to the
rural Amhara. In terms of the model, this would represent a
move toward group type A, one of the least violence-prone group
types.

•

The evolution of ties among the Oromo organizations toward
greater cooperation or even unity. The mobilizing message
among the united and mobilized Oromo would be important: Is
it secessionist, or does it emphasize inclusion in the current
Ethiopian structures? In terms of the model, the crucial variable
is the type of state such an Oro mo group would face. If it were an
exclusive regime type, then the matchup would be highly
violence-prone.

•

Concerning the role of Somalia in the Ogaden, the state's heavyhanded attitude toward the Somali is unlikely to change, but in
case of a revitalized Somalia emerging in the future, the intraEthiopian Somali-centered tension may attain again the interstate conflict dimension that it has had several times in the past.

•

The use of Islamic rhetoric and Islamic appeals, especially by the
Oromo and the Somalis. If, in response, the EPRDF turns toward
greater exclusion of these major non-Tigray groups, then, in
terms of the model, the likelihood of violence will be enhanced.

•

The ongoing process of regionalization and, specifically, the
treatment of minority groups within each ethnic state. For
example, perceived mistreatment of the Amhara minority in the
Oromo state (in terms of land allocation or equal administration
of justice) would escalate the grievances of and potential for the
mobilization of the Amhara.
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Thinking about the dynamics of ethnic relations and potential for
strife in Ethiopia, the framework presented above makes apparent
the following intelligence needs and information gaps:
•

Tracking the rise of militant activists among the urban Amhara
and any evidence that points to their increased preparations for
armed actions against the government.

•

Tracking the appeal of the urban Amhara mobilizational appeals
among the rural Amhara, including the interest by urban Amhara
activists in the rural Amhara, visits, common organizations, and
organizational channels to further the mobilization process.

•

Following closely the appeal of EPRDF to non-Tigrayan groups,
including signs of willingness by the Amhara, Oromo, and Somali
to participate in the governance of the country and the popularity of major non-Tigrayan EPRDF political figures among their
ethnic cohorts.

•

Following closely the appeal of anti-EPRDF, ethnically based
political groupings in the Amhara, Oromo, and Somali regions.

•

Analytical scrutiny of the 1994 census data, including taking into
account the probable errors of under- and overcounting, the
identification of minority groups within regions (for example,
Amhara living in Oromo areas), their projected rates of growth,
and potential for increased ethnic competition at substate
(regional) levels.

•

Additional information on the police, including the principles
used (in theory and in practice) for selection and promotion
within the police force, the ethnic composition of the regional
police forces, and the relationship between the police and the
armed forces at the local level.

•

Additional information on the armed forces, including the
changing ethnic composition of the officer corps and the actual
criteria for promotion, the principles behind stationing and
assignment of troops in the regions, as well as indications of the
overall prestige of the armed forces among the various ethnic
groups.
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Close attention to these issues may enable an early identification and
warning of impending ethnic strife in Ethiopia.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The framework presented here examines the situation in Ethiopia
through a series of dyads, pitting a specific mobilized ethnic group
against the Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian state. As such, the model
does not capture the various intergroup relations that may be influential in the equation. For example, Amhara mobilization may spur
greater Oromo support for the Tigrayan-led government, or, depending on the course the mobilization takes, it could spur the Oromo to
undertake their own mobilization against the Tigray. In other words,
a weakened Tigray-led Ethiopian state may come under challenges
from both the Amhara and the Oromo, with the Amhara-Oromo
relations ranging anywhere from tacit alliance to mutual hostility
(surpassing even their hostility toward the Tigray-led government).
On the other hand, the ethnic mobilization of the Amhara against the
Ethiopian state is interesting in the sense that it stipulates the mobilization of an ethnic group to restore the privileges the group once
had. The two secondary scenarios, focusing on the Oromo and the
Somali, add further depth to the analysis.
Critics may believe that the lack of a multiactor perspective to the
model is a serious flaw that detracts from its usefulness. The lack
may be a necessary shortcoming to make the model user-friendly,
but it need not be a fatal flaw. The framework provides a tool for
thinking abstractly about the mobilization patterns and challenges to
the ruling state authorities. It is meant to provide insight into the
strategic preferences available to the main actors under certain
"what-if' conditions. As such, the model aims to be parsimonious,
and its narrowing of the crucial questions to the main dyad illuminates the logically derived preferences of both actors without
unwieldy mathematical equations. The way to capture the influence
of other parties on the crucial dyad is to include their impact when
calculating the state's and the group's capabilities. For example, in
accounting for the Oromo factor in the Tigray-led state against
Amhara dyad, the limited appeal to the Oromo of the Amhara mobilization can be captured in the assessment of the sustainment and
cohesiveness capacity of the Amhara. Similarly, a potential Oromo
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disinclination to defend the Tigrayan-led state against a challenging
Amhara can be captured in the assessment of all three state capacities.
Since the model was applied to a prospective case, its accuracy in
anticipating the likely strategies that the challenging groups and the
state are likely to follow is, as yet, unverifiable empirically. But the
purpose of applying the model to a prospective case was to provide a
series of hypothetical but likely situations and determine the evolutionary paths for both the state and the group that would result in the
most violence-prone confrontations. As such, the model proved
useful in illustrating the "dangerous dyads."
Finally, the model was designed to structure intelligence analysis,
trace the logical connections in the evolution of tensions along
interethnic lines, and provide a framework for thinking of potential
outcomes to hypothetical situations. Outlining specific trends for
analysts to track-on the basis of their potential for violence-is the
goal of the exercise. The model is a tool toward that end, as it provides the all-important linkage between goals, level of resources, and
the resulting strategies and choices open to the state and the group.
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AFTERWORD
In May 1998, war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The war
was ostensibly over a small patch ofland on the border of Eritrea and
the Ethiopian state of Tigray. However, the armed conflict was precipitated by economic friction between the two countries that began
when Eritrea (officially independent of Ethiopia from 1993) launched
its own currency, the nafka, and demanded that all trade and
exchange between the two countries be conducted in hard currency.
This was a particularly burdensome request for Ethiopia, since it uses
the Eritrean port of Assab to export many of its tractable goods.
Fighting between the two countries continued for a few weeks before
both the UN and the Organization for African Unity began to try to
mediate some sort of peace agreement. These negotiations broke
down, and conflict erupted again in February 1999.
These events have reduced significantly the potential for ethnic
conflict within Ethiopia. The ethnic divisions that were so pronounced before the fighting broke out have receded with the appearance of a new and external enemy. Ethnic divisions within Ethiopia,
and ethnic divisions between Ethiopian groups outside of the country, have become muted as nationalist sentiment is generated by the
war. It is unclear whether or not the war will have a long-term positive effect on the possibility of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. The length
of the war, its outcome, and subsequent government policies will all
play a role in determining the eventual result. The length in particular will be important. As the war drags on, the elections of 2000 may
be far less contentious than previous elections. But when the war
ends, the country could be back to ethnic politics as usual and the
scenarios documented herein will be as relevant as ever.
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ANNEX: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
ETHIOPIA IN 1997-1998

The following information about population characteristics is based
upon the situation in Ethiopia at the beginning of 1998. The information presented here is the basic reference for the analysis in this
chapter.
Name: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
Capital: Addis Ababa.
Nature of government: Nominally parliamentary democratic system
in a federal state with a strong federal prime minister and substantial
local powers held by the regions. The federal parliament consists of
two chambers: the Council of People's Representatives (the lower
chamber) and the Council of the Federation (the upper chamber).
The lower chamber has lawmaking functions and consists of 548
directly elected deputies. The upper chamber is responsible for
reviewing constitutional and regional issues and has 117 deputies
chosen by assemblies in each region. Judges of the Supreme Court
are elected by the legislature.
Organization of the state: A federal state, with nine ethnically based
administrative regions and two cities with regional status: the
federal capital region of Addis Ababa, and Harar. The regions are
Afar, Amhara, Benshangul/Gumaz, Gambela, Oromia, Somalia,
Southern People's Region, Nationalities and Peoples, and Tigray.
Two of the regions (Southern People's Region and Nationalities and
Peoples) contain several small ethnic groups and are defined as territorially defined amalgamations of ethnic groups.
Date of constitution: December 1994 (in effect since August 1995).
Population: 58.7 million (estimate, July 1997).
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Major ethnic groups: Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayan. Dozens of ethnic
groups exist in Ethiopia; classification of the population along ethnic
lines is difficult because of the variety of determinants of ethnicity,
such as language, religion, region, and historical experience. Some
ethnic groups may share a language and/ or religion.
Languages: Major languages are Amharic (official language),
Tigrinya, Oromiffa, Guaraginga, Somali, Arabic, English. More than
seventy languages are spoken in Ethiopia, most of them belonging to
three families of the Afro-Asiatic language group: Semitic (EthioSemitic and Arabic branches), Cushitic, and Omotic. A small portion
of the population (approximately 2 percent) are native speakers of
language families belonging to the Nila-Saharan language group:
East Sudanic, Koman, Berta, and Kunema. The principal languages
within the Ethio-Semitic group are Amharic and Tigrinya. Of the various Cushitic languages (subdivided into Highland and Lowland East
Cushitic, Central Cushitic, and Northern Cushitic), Orominga and
Somali are the most numerous. Weleyta are the most numerous
speakers of the Omotic language group.
Religions: Islam, Orthodox Christianity, animism. (Catholicism and
Protestantism also present.)
Population statistics: Because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate
population statistics, the data presented here should be interpreted
as approximations. The sometimes wide variance in estimates
means that percentages of the total population-according to religious or linguistic differences-are more significant than the absolute figures.
Some Oromo factions believe the government grossly underestimates the Oromo population and land claims. They claim traditional
lands north of Addis Ababa and south to the Kenyan border. These
factions are correct insofar as particular "Oromo" groups have been
classified by their subgroup (such as the Borana, who are Oromiffa
speakers and considered part of the larger Oromo people, but whom
the government defines as Borana). However, not surprisingly, the
Oromo idea of a "Greater Oromia" suffers from its own shortcomings. For example, some Oromos claim that Addis Ababa, Debre
Berhan, and Tegulet and Bulga are traditional Oromo lands, over-

236 Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Case Applications of a Process Model

looking the fact that non-Oromo indigenous populations in some of
these areas exceed 50 percent.
The Christian and Muslim populations of Ethiopia are generally
mixed, but we can make some cursory generalizations about their
regional distribution. The population to the north of Addis Ababa,
on the highland plateau, is predominantly Orthodox Christian. The
population to the south of Addis Ababa in the Rift Valley and east
tends to be Muslim, and people west of the Rift Valley are Christian.
Animist practices are found among the pastoralists inhabiting the far
south of the country and scattered throughout the south. Amhara
Table5.9
Population ofEthiopia by Ethnicity

Ethnic Group
Oro mo
Am hara
Ti gray

Sidamo
Shankella
Somali
Afar

Percent of Population,
CIA World Factbook

Percent of Population,
Library of Congress

40a
32

40a
30
15

9
6
6
4
2

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

Gurage
Others

15

aoromo groups estimate their numbers at 50-60 percent of the total
population. Feyise Demi, "The Oromo Population and the Politics of
Numbers in Ethiopia," The Oromo Commentary, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996.

Table5.10
Religion Statistics

Religion
Orthodox Christian
Muslim
Animist
Protestant/Catholic
Other

Percent of Population,
CIA World Factbook

Percent of Population,
Library of Congress

35-40
45-50

50
40
NA
2
NA

12

NA
3-8
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and Tigrinya speakers predominate in northern Ethiopia and in the
cities. Ororno speakers can be found throughout the south and west
of Ethiopia, with a large concentration in Addis Ababa.
Table5.ll
Population ofEthiopia by Language Group

Ethnic Group
Am hara

Oro mo
Tigray
Weleyta
Somali
Gurage
Hadiya
Kembata
Afar
Harari (Aderi)

Speakers
(millions)

Percent of
Population

15
14
4
2
2
1.5

28.5
26.6
7.6
3.8
3.8
2.9
1.9
1.9
1.0
0.06

1
0.5
0.03

SOURCE: Ethnologue, 13th Edition, Barbara F. Grimes (ed.).
Summer Institute of Linguistics, Inc., 1996.

